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r Anna Cabré, of the Depart- 
ment of Geography of the Auto- 
nomous University, is one of 
those increasingly rare examples of an 
expert who refuses to be caught up in 
the bureaucratic whirlpool of academic 
organisation. Her presence in the uni- 
versity setting, at board meetings and 
on commissions, in the classroom, in re- 
search, is no more likely to be snared in 
the traps of officialdom than a gust of 
wind. Perhaps this is  because she be- 
longs to the generation of Catalan uni- 
versity students who were caught up in 
the events of May 1968 when they 
were studying in Paris twenty-five years 
ago. At the same time, her conversation 
conveys a passion for her work -that is, 
for demography-, which over and 
above its attention to coldly precise fig- 
ures and complex graphs constantly 
reminds us that we are dealing with 
real, flesh-and-blood people. 
Recently, along with environmental 
problems, demographic issues have 
been in the news: the low birth-rate, the 
increasing age of the population, and 
especially the question of immigration. 
This concern on the part of society must 
weigh heavily on the research work that 
can be done in a centre like the one you 
direct ... 
The creation o f  the Centre dlEstudis De- 
mografics in 1984 obviously bore some 
relation to the demographic problems 
o f  those years, marked by  the falling 
birth rate in the countries o f  the West 
during the previous ten years, and in 
Catalonia, also, by  the inversion in the 
migratory flow. It was a difficult mo- 
ment, because o f  the economic crisis, 
and there was definite concern for de- 
mographic issues. 
Nowadays, although the birth rate 
hasn't increased, it seems that the em- 
phasis o f  this concern is shifting; the 
problems are seen more in terms o f  po- 
pulation growth in relation to ecological 
issues, on the one hand, and on the 
other, in relation to international migra- 
tions. As for this second aspect, 1 think 
there's a real psychosis, and as 1 see it 
there's no iustification for this psychosis, 
especially if we  look at  the figures 
themselves. 
So when it comes to the more public 
side o f  our work, we're especially in 
demand over the subiect o f  migrations, 
although this doesn't really correspond 
to the aims o f  the research grants we 
receive or  the research we actually 
do. 
As a matter o f  fact, the subject o f  migra- 
tions isn't really a concern o f  demo- 
graphy, it stonds at  a crossroads o f  
severa1 specialities. W e  at  the CED are 
basically involved in the study o f  popu- 
lation geography, the demographic 
study o f  the territory, particularly in Ca- 
talonia, periodic variations in growth, 
growth tendencies, the patterns that 
emerge.. . 
- But couldn't demography accentuate 
the doom-laden talk you tend to find 
surrounding these issues, or does it ac- 
tually put the question more in perspec- 
tive? 
- That depends more on the demo- 
graphers than on demography itself. In- 
terpretations o f  the sume set o f  figures 
can vary widely. Especially when you 
make forecasts, because highly subjec- 
tive opinions are inevitably involved. 
But the field o f  opinions, o f  value judge- 
ments, isn't really anything to d o  with 
demograph y. 
- Nevertheless, could we say that de- 
mographic studies can make for a de- 
mographic "ethic", or, if you like, the 
"necessary" patterns of collective beha- 
viour, as well as the "right" population 
policies? 
- What demography can d o  is to de- 
bunk a series o f  commonplaces, rather 
than provide political or  ethical an- 
swers. But the fact is that whether you 
like it or  not the demographic discourse 
doesn't come chiefly from us; it comes 
from al1 sorts a f  people: journalists, po- 
liticians, bishops.. . right d o  wn to the 
man in the street. 1 think there's un age- 
o ld concern for demographic issues. For 
thousands o f  years, growth has been a 
good thing. Depopulation was almost 
another word for devastation. And this 
is still rooted somewhere in the depths 
o f  our unconscious: the feeling is that if 
we don ' t  grow, we '11 disappear, that 
we'll have no future, that we'll probably 
end up being invaded by people from 
outside. These are age-old feelings that 
are so powerful and so deep-rooted 
that they can even be  used to mobilize 
the population. 
In this situation, what the demographer 
can d o  is to refute things, to demons- 
trate what hasn't been proved, to show 
the factors that play a part in any pro- 
cess ..., but the decision about popula- 
tion policies has to be taken by the 
politician or  whoever's responsible. The 
most the demographer can d o  is to 
show that a certain policy goes against 
what the politician says he wants to 
achieve. 
For example, in Catalonia there was 
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talk o f  promoting a third-child policy to 
counteract the low birth-rate. To start 
with, the idea is totally absurd if it 
doesn't form part o f  a global demo- 
graphic policy, and the fact is that there 
isn't one in this country. In a case like 
this the demographer can say that in 
fact the drop in the population o f  the 
eighties stems from the decline in mar- 
riages, in un incredible delay in mar- 
rioge. O n  one hand, there's been a de- 
crease in the marriage rate, in the for- 
mation o f  couples, and on the other 
hand, once married, a delay Ni the ar- 
rival o f the first and second children. In 
this situation, a third-child policy, when 
people aren't even getting married, is 
bound to foil. 
The fundamental problem in this case is 
the delay in the formation o f  the family. 
At the moment, just a delay. People 
aren't saying they don't want to get 
married, but that they don't want to get  
married "yet". But eventually it could 
also turn into real inhibition. The solu- 
tion in a case like this one isn't to say 
"Have more children", but "Have them 
now". In other words, to introduce poli- 
cies that encourage the anticipation o f  
natality. This is the only sense you can 
say that demography can condition the 
policies that are implemented, because 
according to the analysis o f  the causes, 
these policies can be  totally different. 
The thing is that demographic facts 
can't be explained by demography 
itself, but by  a series o f  social factors. 
There are a whole series o f  basic cons- 
tants that have to be  borne in mind: 
monogamy, the nine months o f  gesta- 
tion, the duration o f  the fertile period ... 
The demographer's duty is to  analyse 
each and every one o f  the relations 
established between al1 the factors in 
his field, and his outlook must always be  
filled in from other fields. Our duty is to 
describe and explain. 
The issues that have a value basis are 
decided socially b y  consensus: for 
example, living as well as possible, 
having the best possible education ..., 
they're like a sort o f  taboo a t  the mo- 
ment; no-one disputes them. And any 
attempt to question them would be  ex- 
tremely unpopular, though it could be  
done. It's precisely this cultural consen- 
sus that defines socially what's good 
and what isn't about specific situations, 
and not demography. 
- The political decisions affecting po- 
pulation, such as immigration control, are 
measures with an important ethical and 
political dimension, affecting fundarnen- 
tal rights of the individual. Do you think 
these decisions are made taking into 
account the guidance demography can 
provide? 
- There's often a large measure o f  dou- 
ble-talk in these policies. Problems 
verging on law and order, like the pre- 
sent waves o f  racism, sometimes force 
political declarations that aren't neces- 
sarily put into practice. They're mude so 
as to create con fidence and to give the 
impression that the problem's being ta- 
ken in hand, rather than to be carried 
out. 
- Let's speak of the case in Catalonia. 
It's been said that Catalonia is an ex- 
ceptional laboratory from the point of 
view of demography. 1s that true? 
- Yes, that's true. The fact is that Cata- 
lonia shows some quite remarkable 
characteristics. First o f  all, a very early 
fa11 in fertility. After Frunce, i t  was one 
o f  the first places in Europe where ferti- 
lity began to drop. But there's still an- 
other differentiating feature: life expec- 
tancy in France was much higher than 
here. In contrast, fertility in Catalonia 
dropped when life expectancy reached 
thirty years, while in the rest o f  Europe it 
was already forty years. This decrease 
was very strange, because i t  wasn't un 
exclusively urban phenomenon. It was 
probably a response on the part o f  the 
rural society itself in favour o f  the main- 
tenance o f  the home. W e  mustn't forget 
that throughout the nineteenth century 
people lived with the threat o f  having 
the Spanish legal system imposed in 
place o f  their own, which would have 
had a profound effect on the institution 
o f  the heir -that is, the preservation o f  
the property structure. 
In Catalonia, then, the disproportion 
between high mortality and low birth- 
rate took place early on. Overall repro- 
duction in 1860 was o f  some eighty chil- 
dren per one hundred women. But pop- 
ulation growth was guaranteed thanks 
to the increase in life expectancy, and 
subsequently the fact that daughters 
lived longer than their mothers. Al1 the 
same, we have one o f  the lowest birth- 
rates in the world, beaten only b y  Ligu- 
Na and Piedmont. 
And secondly, we have higher immigra- 
tion than Australia, Argentina or  the 
United States, which are typical immi- 
gration countries. To grasp the scale o f  
this process, just think that compared to 
the approximately two million inhabi- 
tants Catalonia had in 1900, there 
would now b e  2,400,000 if it hadn't 
been for immigration in the twentieth 
century. That means that today there 
are 3,600,000 Catalans who are a di- 
rect or  indirect consequence o f  this cen- 
tury's immigration. In other words, the 
population's roots are more recent than 
those o f  the Argentines or the Austra- 
lions. It's incredible. 
This is what characterizes Catalonia: for 
one hundred years there was a very 
low birth-rate accompanied by  high im- 
migration. At  the same time. And that's 
without the interna1 immigration. Be- 
cause the immigration that comes from 
outside Catalonia is the continuation o f 
a movement that starts from inside and 
goes on from outside. 
So we  could speak o f  a Catalan system 
of reproduction. But we're now a t  a 
point where this system could come to 
an end, precisely because o f  the estab- 
lishment o f  administrative barriers to  im- 
migration. Until now, immigrants came 
from other parts o f  Spain, without admi- 
nistrative obstacles, but the ones that 
could come now d o  have them. What 
this in fact means is that the continuity o f  
this pattern is a material impossibility, 
and that could have very serious conse- 
quences. 
- And won't it become much easier for 
immigration to arrive from Europe? 
- No. Because in Europe, when adrnin- 
istrative barriers come down, immigra- 
tion movements have always diminished 
-now and in the past. It's a historical 
fact. 
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The thing is that in the question o f  immi- 
gration, as I said earlier, there's a real 
psychosis, because the figures are  
really low compared to other periods in 
history. There have been other, far 
more important moments in this respect. 
In the five years after the Second Wor ld 
war, German y received 12 million immi- 
grants, with its economy in ruins follow- 
ing the war. Now, in spite o f  al1 the 
fuss that's mude, it gets no more than 
450,000 immigrants a year. Also, Eur- 
ope exported 5 0  million immigrants 
during the nineteenth century. And in 
the sixties Frunce received half a million 
Algerians in just a few years. And none 
o f  this produced anything like the 
psychosis there is today. Think o f  Cana- 
da, too, which receives huge numbers 
o f  immigrants, and yet there they've 
always had problems with the sume lo- 
cal, interior ethnic groups. Objectively 
speaking, we're not going through such 
un extraordinary moment in immigration 
as people think. 
-Can you tell us a bit more about the 
exact characteristics of this Catalan 
system of reproduction? 
- The system o f  reproduction we have 
here isn't only a demographic system: 
it's a system with low fertility and high 
immigration, but also with a marked up- 
ward social mobility, though tightly 
structured, however contradictory that 
might sound. You have to remember 
that this system arose in a society that 
was bent on maintaining family produc- 
tion units: the home, the family business, 
the cottage industry. According to the 
model o f  growth adopted, it could have 
threatened this form o f  accumulation o f  
capital. On the other hand, growth 
through externa1 immigration meant i t  
could b e  maintained without dispersal. 
To put i t  a bit more simply, people from 
outside don't inherit here, and this 
makes i t  possible to preserve the heri- 
tage. Immigrants, a t  first, occupy the 
lower positions. They come in a t  the 
bottom, which doesn't collapse social 
ascent, and yet they can take part in 
that upward movement. It's a system 
that sucks in new immigrants. The ad- 
vantage, as 1 said, is that it doesn ' t  break 
up family patrimonies, a t  the sume time 
as it allows new arrivals the chance to  
move upwards. It's difficult a t  first, but 
the country o ffers lots o f opportunities. 
This isn't the case in al1 the regions with 
immigration, because in the metropoli- 
tan areas o f  the European capitals, for 
example, people o f al1 socio-professio- 
no1 levels arrive. Not  here. And that's 
also why Europe can't provide immigra- 
tion o f  a type that would be  prepared 
a t  first to  occupy the lowest levels o f  the 
social ladder. The only people who can 
come are from outside the European 
Community, and especially Moroccans. 
- Would it be true to say that it's pre- 
cisely this Catalan system of reproduc- 
tion that explains the low social conflic- 
tivity there is in Catalonia, in spite of the 
scale of immigration? 
- Exactly, because it's a very "Ameri- 
can" system, and on the other hand it's 
very different from other metropolitan 
areas o f  Europe. This is a social system 
o f  integration. The immigrant here im- 
mediately gets stung by  the bug o f  so- 
cial ascent. At the sume time, the rule 
for marriages is exogamic, with the 
relative exception o f  the Andalusians, 
who perhaps have mixed less because 
they're often already married when 
they arrive. The attitude is a receptive 
one. 
It's also interesting to note that women 
in Catalonia show downward social mo- 
bility. Men tend to  look for women o f  a 
higher category. And the woman mar- 
ries beneath the leve1 o f  her family. Al1 
that's asked o f  a woman is that she 
marry a hard-working young man. Ca- 
talan women have had a lot o f  leeway 
for marriage. As a result, they've been 
ideal for the social promotion o f  immi- 
grants. The fact is that it's easier for a 
male immigrant to get  married than i t  is 
for a female. Today, Moroccan men 
don't have much difficulty marrying Ca- 
talan women. What's more, it's a pat- 
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tern that makes for integration at  a 
working-class level. In fact it's been the 
working-class levels that have been re- 
sponsible for integration in this country. 
- And how can one explain the preser- 
vation of a national identity in spite of 
al1 this? 
- The system o f  integration in a cultural 
identity has a great advantage. One o f  
the main characteristics o f  this identity is 
the language, and this is the least harm- 
ful o f  the possible forms o f  integration. 
Differences in skin colour, and even 
changes in religion, are much more dif- 
ficult ... And while it would appear that 
one can't have two religions, you can 
get to know and use two languages, 
and use one or  the other as appro- 
priate. 
Being Catalan, then, is open to every- 
one. Like being American. In the sume 
way as it would be incomprehensible in 
the USA for someone to turn down the 
chance o f  being American, no immigrant 
in Catalonia would see the sense in re- 
nouncing being Catalan. If you can, why 
not? And o f  course, without having to 
give up being what you were originally. 
"Being Catalan", then, means accepting 
a sort o f  code o f  conduct, and what's 
more, one in which the language isn't 
the basic element. The main thing, to be 
Catalan, is this wish not to create con- 
flicts, to be  tolerant ... W e  can think up a 
kind o f  imaginary "ten commandments" 
to sum up the way this wish should be  
expressed: first, never speak ill o f  Cata- 
lonia ... and if possible, think no iII 
either; second, don't get in the way o f  
the Catalanization o f  your children; 
third, work hard; fourth, always say 
"grac ies"  (thank-you), "sisplau" 
(please), etc.; fifth, show your concern for 
avoiding conflicts, for easing personal 
relations ..., etc. If you stick to that, 
you're quite free to keep up the cul- 
tural habits o f  your country o f  origin. 
Then there's the language. In Catalo- 
nia, a Senegalese or a Moroccan who 
speaks Catalan is a Senegalese Cata- 
lan or  a Moroccan Catalan. The key is 
to express a wish to belong to  the 
community. And as this can't be  denied 
anyone, the way is open ... 
- So can we say that Catalan national- 
ism doesn't imply narrow-mindedness, 
conflict, exclusion ... ? 
- As Catalanness is an open concept, it 
could also change. But for the time 
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being, that's the way  it is. The definition 
o f  identity through language is the ideal 
system from this point o f  view. 
Also, the best vaccine against racism is 
immersion, as in Canada. Contrary to  
what people have been saying recently, 
it's not true that there's un immigration 
threshold beyond which conflict arises. 
In fact, it's the other way  round. It would 
b e  true to soy that we're al1 immigrants 
in Catalonia. As 1 say, two thirds o f  us 
are a result o f  immigration in the twen- 
tieth century. If, on top o f  this, we re- 
member that they've never been a se- 
gregated community, then w e  can say 
that three quarters o f  the Catalans are 
either immigrants, or  married to  immi- 
grants, o r  are descended from immi- 
grants. Catalans who are totally unre- 
lated to  the immigrant population pro- 
bably make up less than fifteen o r  
twenty per cent o f  the population, and  
have un average age o f  over sixty, and 
probably live in very isolated areas that 
are in decline. Amongst people under 
the age o f  twenty, probably not even 
five per cent are Catalans without any 
twentieth century immigrant relations. 
So no-one can speak ill o f  immigrants; 
w e  al1 live in glass houses. At  al1 events, 
the rule is that racism disappears above 
a certain threshold. 
In short, not al1 nationalism is divisive, 
o r  conflictive ... The Catalan brand is a 
functional nationalism, one that makes 
for cohesion. 
- Finally, Dr Cabré, don't you think 
you're dealing with "high risk material" 
when you analyse these questions of 
population movements, which tend to 
be  so far-reaching and which are often 
a source of serious conflict? 
- I've already said that the demograph- 
ic discourse is also used to  conjure up 
images o f  doom, t o  stir up fear, but it 
needn't b e  like that. Quite the contrary. 
As un example, w e  could bring home t o  
people that immigration from poor  
countries to  rich ones isn't a bad thing. 
In fact, this would bring down fertility in 
poor  countries, it would mean a redistri- 
bution o f  resources and other advant- 
ages that would b e  difficult to  achieve 
b y  other means. 1 think a generous im- 
migration policy is a g o o d  thing. As 
many as possible should be  allowed in. 
That's positive. In contrast, any kind o f  
barrier is a b a d  thing. It's very impor- 
tant to  b e  able to guarantee freedom o f  
movement. ¤ 
